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CHAPTER SEVEN
The Concept of Persons 
in Kant and Fichte*
Owen Ware
Beings whose existence rests not on our will but on nature, if they are nonrational 
beings, still have only a relative worth as means, and are therefore called things, 
whereas rational beings are called persons because their nature already marks them out 
as an end in itself.
— kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785)
1  Introduction
One of Kant’s most famous and celebrated declarations in the 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) is that one ought 
always to treat persons as ends in themselves and never as mere means.1 
Surprisingly, the ontological status of persons in Kant’s moral philoso-
phy has gone largely overlooked by scholars, despite the fact that this 
status is visible in his remark that persons are “marked out” as ends, 
and thereby distinguished from things, due to their “nature” (Natur).2 
Once one shifts attention to the nature of persons in his theoreti-
cal philosophy, there is evidence to suggest that Kant maintains core 
 * For feedback on earlier versions of this chapter, I would like to thank René Brouwer, Anthony 
Bruno, Johannes Haag, Dai Heide, Karolina Hübner, Antonia LoLordo, Colin Marshall, Allen 
Wood, and Ariel Zylberman, as well as audience members at Indiana University.
 1 Citations of Kant refer to the Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Deutsche (formerly Königlich- 
Preussische) Akademie der Wissenschaften. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1900– ). Translations are my own. 
The epigraph to the chapter is from Kant, G 4:428.
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views of the rationalist school— from Leibniz, Descartes, and their 
scholastic predecessors— for whom persons are individual substances 
endowed with intrinsic properties.3 Though Kant subjects these views 
to a rigorous critique, denying their status as strong knowledge claims, 
he continues to affirm that a broadly scholastic account of persons fol-
lows from the concept of the “I” and so remains analytically true.4 My 
aim in this chapter is to examine Kant’s ontological model of persons 
and its eventual transformation in the hands of his early successor, J. G. 
Fichte.
2 Persons in Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy
2.1 “I Think”: Kant’s Critique of Rational Psychology
On first glance what Kant has to say about the ontological model 
of persons is largely, if not entirely, negative. In the Critique of Pure 
Reason (1781/ 87), for example, one finds a separate chapter devoted 
to the fallacious errors (termed “paralogisms”) that beset the rational 
 3 While this philosophical tradition has roots in Aristotle, Boethius is one of the first thinkers to 
define a person explicitly in these terms: “Wherefore if person belongs to substances alone, and 
these rational, and if every substance is a nature, and exists not in universals but in individuals, 
we have found the definition of person: ‘The individual substance of a rational nature’ [naturae 
rationabilis individua substantial].” The Theological Tractates, trans. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and 
S. J. Tester (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 85. Kant’s association of the “dig-
nity” of persons and their “self- subsisting existence” also has a clear precedent in Aquinas, who 
writes: “Now, the nature which person includes in its signification is the most worthy [dignissima] 
of all natures, namely, the intellectual nature according to its genus; and likewise the mode of 
existing signified by person is the most worthy [dignissimus], namely, such that something be exist-
ing by itself [per se existens].” Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei, trans. English Dominican 
Fathers (Maryland: Newman Press: 1952), q. 9, a. 3, corp). Thanks to Martin Pickavé and Peter 
King for conversations on this material. For fuller treatments of the pre- Kantian context, see 
Theo Kobusch, Die Entdeckung der Person: Metaphysik der Freiheit und modernes Menschenbild 
(Freiburg: Herder, 1993), as well as  chapters 2 and 6 here.
 4 Depending on the context, Kant’s definition of a person changes, meaning either (1) intelligence 
(rational nature as such), (2) autonomy (moral self- determination), or (3) personal identity 
(continuity of self- consciousness over time). In some places he argues for a connection between 
two or all three (see Refl 4225; MS 6:223; and Anth 7:127). However, because Kant also speaks 
of personal identity and moral autonomy as specific attributes of persons, I shall employ the first 
(more general) sense in this chapter. For further discussion, see Georg Mohr, “Der Begriff der 
Person bei Kant, Fichte und Hegel,” in Philosophiegeschichte— Theoretische Philosophie— Praktische 
Philosophie, ed. Dieter Sturma (Münster: Mentis, 2001).
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psychologist, and Kant’s task is to trace these errors to a common root. 
The mistake is to assume that by attending carefully to the “I think” of 
self- consciousness one can somehow access the nature of the soul, that 
human beings are simple substances, identical over time, and immate-
rial.5 The cause of this mistake, Kant explains, is that anyone reflect-
ing on the I  is exposed to an illusion:  that the subjective conditions 
for thinking about oneself appear to be objective conditions for one’s 
existence.6 Deceived by this illusion, the rational psychologist assumes 
that the concepts necessary for thinking of the I— substantiality, 
simplicity, identity, and immateriality— support strong knowledge 
claims about the inner constitution of persons. Yet once this illusion is 
exposed, the insight one is left with is that such concepts have only sub-
jective validity. They “cannot teach us any of the ordinary conclusions 
of the rationalistic doctrine of the soul,” Kant explains, “such as, e.g., 
the everlasting duration of the soul through all alterations, including 
the human being’s death.”7 This is the basic lesson of the Paralogisms.
But just how deflationary is the lesson supposed to be? On the one 
hand the result Kant appears to be seeking is that all claims about the 
true nature of persons are empty. Once one realizes that cognition 
requires intuition, and that intuition (at least for human beings) is 
subject to the conditions of space and time, Kant thinks it should be 
clear why the project of knowing one’s inner constitution is hopeless. 
As he argues, the intrinsic properties of the soul the rational psycholo-
gist purports to apprehend are nothing more than “pure categories, 
through which I never think a determinate object, but rather only the 
unity of representations.”8 Remarks like this suggest that Kant aims to 
curtail claims about persons to their phenomenal status (as they appear 
in space and time), and thereby denounce as meaningless all assertions 
 5 Kant, A345/ B403.
 6 Kant, A396.
 7 Kant, A350– 351.
 8 Kant, A399.
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about persons in their noumenal status (as they exist outside space 
and time). Kant even says that when philosophers look at the doctrine 
of the soul more closely, “we can place nothing but the simple and in 
content for itself wholly empty representation I” at its basis, “of which 
one cannot even say that it is a concept, but a mere consciousness that 
accompanies every concept. Through this I, or He, or It (the thing), 
which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental 
subject of thoughts = x.”9 Beyond this it seems there is nothing more 
that can be said.
On the other hand there are passages indicating that Kant is more 
permissive in his view of what humans can know about their noumenal 
status. A striking example appears later in the first Critique when Kant 
considers what human beings can say about themselves through pure 
self- consciousness or what he calls “pure apperception”:
In lifeless nature and nature having merely animal life, we find no 
ground for thinking of any faculty which is other than sensibly con-
ditioned. The human being alone, who is otherwise acquainted with 
the whole of nature only through sense, cognizes himself [erkennt 
sich selbst] also through mere apperception, and indeed in actions 
and inner determinations which cannot at all be counted among 
the impressions of sense. He is admittedly in one part phenomenon, 
but in another part, namely in regard to certain capacities, a merely 
intelligible object, because the actions of this object cannot at all 
be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility. We call these capacities 
understanding and reason.10
Upon reading passages like this, one might wonder how Kant is enti-
tled to speak of the “merely intelligible” side of human nature, given 
everything he has said in the Paralogisms. Apprehending oneself as a 
 9 Kant, A346.
 10 Kant A546– 547/ B574– 575.
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noumenal person on the basis of pure apperception seems to be the 
very ambition of rational psychology, and Kant has already shown 
that this ambition rests on a deceptive illusion. Humans cannot secure 
strong knowledge claims about themselves through reflection on the 
I, because reflection on the I yields no corresponding intuition— and 
without intuition, we have no basis for cognition. Is Kant then not 
guilty of a contradiction here?
My view is that the answer depends on how one characterizes the real 
target of the Paralogisms.11 If Kant is targeting all claims about persons 
in themselves, then arguably he would be guilty of inconsistency, deny-
ing knowledge of humans’ noumenal status in the first instance, and 
then asserting such knowledge later in the book. Yet there are indica-
tions that Kant’s initial aim is more modest, and that what he is target-
ing in the Paralogisms is not claims about noumenal persons in general 
but the synthetic claims made by the rational psychologist in particu-
lar.12 A clue to this line of interpretation occurs when Kant writes: “If 
anyone were to pose the question to me, ‘Of what is the constitution 
of a thing that thinks?’ then I do not know the least a priori to answer, 
because the answer should be synthetic (for an analytic answer perhaps 
explains thinking, but gives no extended cognition).”13 The mistake 
of the rational psychologist is to assume, for example, that the pure 
concept of substance extends cognition to the I qua noumenon, yield-
ing determinate insight into one of its intrinsic properties. Curtailing 
 11 There is an excellent new body of literature on this topic. See Eric Watkins, Kant and the 
Metaphysics of Causality (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2005); Karl Ameriks, “The 
Critique of Metaphysics:  The Structure and Fate of Kant’s Dialectic,” in Kant and Modern 
Philosophy, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2006), 269– 302; Colin 
Marshall, “Kant’s Metaphysics of the Self,” Philosophers’ Imprint 10 (2010): 1– 21; Julian Wuerth, 
“The Paralogisms of Pure Reason,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 
ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 210– 244; Christopher J. Insole, 
Kant and the Creation of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Corey W. Dyck, Kant 
and Rational Psychology (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2014); and Nicholas Stang, Kant’s 
Modal Metaphysics (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2016). I  have also benefited from many 
fruitful conversations with Dai Heide.
 12 See Wuerth, “The Paralogisms of Pure Reason,” 211.
 13 Kant, A398.
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this theoretical pretension does not jettison all claims about noumenal 
persons, one could argue, since it leaves untouched claims of an inde-
terminate scope. On this way of reading of the text, Kant’s subsequent 
talk of knowing ourselves through pure apperception does not neces-
sarily commit a fallacy, at least not if one reads it as a general statement 
about things in themselves.14
There is also textual evidence showing that Kant relies on weak 
knowledge claims about things in themselves into his Critical period, 
especially when he attacks the substance monism of Spinoza— whose 
system I shall return to later. In lecture transcripts dating from the mid- 
1780s, Kant accuses Spinoza of proceeding from a faulty definition of 
a substance as that which does not require the existence of anything 
else. On the basis of this definition Spinoza infers correctly that all 
individual things, including ourselves, are not finite substances at all, 
but accidents inhering in one infinite substance, a “whole of reality” 
(omnitudo realitatis) he calls “God.”15 But Kant thinks that one has 
no reason to accept this inference when one develops a proper defini-
tion of a substance as that which exists for itself “without being a deter-
mination of any other thing.”16 Following this, Kant goes on to defend 
humans’ status as finite substances on the basis of pure apperception, 
and what he says is telling:
The consciousness of myself testifies that I  do not relate all my 
actions to God as the final subject which is not the predicate of any 
other thing, and thus the concept of a substance arises when I per-
ceive in myself that I am not the predicate of any further thing. For 
example, when I think, I am conscious that my I, and not some other 
thing, thinks in me. I  infer therefore that this thinking in me does 
 14 See Wuerth, “The Paralogisms of Pure Reason,” 211.
 15 Kant, PR 28:1041– 1042. See A572/ B600– A582/ B610 for Kant’s brief but highly suggestive 
account of how the omnitudo realitatis still admits of a regulative use in philosophers’ search for 
systematic unity in nature.
 16 Kant, PR 28: 1041– 1042.
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not inhere in another thing outside me but in myself, and conse-
quently also that I am a substance, i.e., that I exist for myself, with-
out being the predicate of another thing. I myself am a thing and 
hence also a substance.17
As with his claim in the first Critique that a human being apprehends 
himself through pure apperception, what Kant may be saying here is 
that by reflecting on the I, one can know in some metaphysical sense 
what one is not, that is, that one is not accidental, composite, plural, 
and so forth.18 And while that still leaves open the question of the soul’s 
survival after the human being’s death, it is seemingly weighty enough 
to block Spinoza’s dangerous idea that humans are not noumenal per-
sons but mere modes of an all- encompassing divinity.19
2.2 The Transcendental Unity of Apperception
The question of whether Kant’s first Critique permits anything like 
a theory of noumenal persons has become a topic of controversy 
in recent years, and from the sketch I  have offered it is easy to see 
why. However, despite the extensive literature Kant’s account has 
now generated, few commentators pause to consider his argument 
that the theorems of rational psychology follow from the unity of 
self- consciousness and so enjoy the status of analytic truths. In this 
connection one finds Kant asking:  “But what sort of use am I  now 
to make of this concept of a substance? That I, as a thinking being, 
endure for myself, that naturally I neither arise nor perish? This I can 
by no means infer.”20 Soon afterward he adds a more positive remark, 
 17 Kant, PR 28: 1041– 1042; emphasis added. See also Refl 6275.
 18 See Wuerth, “The Paralogisms of Pure Reason,” 211.
 19 See Karl Ameriks, “Idealism and Kantian Persons: Spinoza, Jacobi, and Schleiermacher,” in Kant’s 
Elliptical Path (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 120– 142, for a penetrating treatment of 
this issue, to which I am much indebted.
 20 Kant, A349.
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that “one can quite well allow the proposition The soul is substance to 
be valid, if only one admits that this concept of ours does not at all 
lead further . . . [and] that it denotes a substance only in idea but not in 
reality.”21 While the main thrust of such passages is critical, Kant still 
believes that the substantiality of the soul, falsely arrogated as a syn-
thetic claim by the rational psychologist, is logically true about one’s 
representation of the I. And the same holds, he believes, for the other 
pure categories: “Now mere apperception (‘I’) is substance in concept, 
simple in concept, etc., and thus all these psychological theorems are 
indisputably correct.”22
While this claim is integral to Kant’s philosophy as a whole, his 
explicit argument for it is rather elusive. As the cited passage shows, 
Kant is assuming the reader’s familiarity with his earlier principle of 
the “transcendental unity of apperception,” according to which my rep-
resentations are only possible to the extent that I can ascribe them to 
myself.23 What the apperception principle is meant to show is that the 
unity of my representations rests on the unity of the “I think” attend-
ing my representations. Or, as Kant puts it, it is only because “I can 
combine a manifold of given representations in one consciousness that 
it is possible for me to represent the identity of the consciousness in 
these representations itself,” to which he adds: “otherwise I would have 
as multicolored, diverse a self as I have representations of which I am 
conscious.”24 Among the many insights Kant thinks one acquires from 
the apperception principle, the one relevant to his discussion of the 
Paralogisms is that the Cartesian or Leibnizian is in some sense right. 
The I is “substance” in concept, to take one case, because I must rep-
resent myself as the subject of my thoughts and not as their predicate. 
In reflecting on myself, I am justified to think of myself as a substance 
 21 Kant, A350– 351.
 22 Kant, A400; emphasis added.
 23 Kant, B131– 132; see also A107– 108.
 24 Kant, B134.
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(and so I have no reason to think of myself as an accident inhering in 
another substance, as Kant thinks Spinozism absurdly concludes).
This much is now clear. As pure categories for thinking of the tran-
scendental unity of apperception, substantiality, simplicity, identity, 
and immateriality are “indisputably correct,” even though they teach 
humans nothing determinate about their inner constitution. What is 
less clear, however, is Kant’s argument for thinking of the appercep-
tion principle exclusively through the medium of these four catego-
ries. When one returns to the details of the text for an answer, it is 
surprising how little Kant says on the topic. One revealing stretch of 
text appears in the section of the first Critique where Kant divides the 
paralogisms into a table. When one attends to the paralogisms more 
closely, he explains, “one notes that apperception is carried through by 
all classes of categories, but only toward those concepts of the under-
standing which underlie the ground of unity [Grunde der Einheit] 
of the remaining ones in their class in a possible perception, conse-
quently:  subsistence, reality, unity (not plurality), and existence.”25 
According to this progression, Kant is saying that my efforts to cog-
nize myself yield four analytic truths about the I, truths one can affirm 
without succumbing to the errors of rational psychology. They are:
 (1) That “I” am subsisting and not inhering;
 (2) That “I” am simple and not composite;
 (3) That “I” am identical and not numerically different over time; 
and finally,
 (4) That “I” exist independently of what I represent in space, 
including my body.26
While Kant does not discuss this point further, it is worth stopping to 
ask why the subject attempting to apprehend itself only employs these 
 25 Kant, A403; emphasis added.
 26 Kant, A403.
 The Concept of Persons in Kant and Fichte 241
categories. When one goes back and inspects all twelve categories Kant 
listed earlier in the first Critique— at A80/ B106— one can see right 
away that, with the exception of modality, the theorems of rational 
psychology rest on the first- level concepts:
I. Quantity II. Quality III. Relation IV. Modality
1. Unity 1. Reality 1. Subsistence 1. Possibility
2. Plurality 2. Negation 2. Causality 2. Existence
3. Totality 3. Limitation 3. Community 3. Necessity
Considering this rich array of options, the initial question I  posed 
becomes all the more pressing. Why does Kant think the subject seek-
ing to apprehend itself only employs “substance” under the heading 
of relation, “reality” under the heading of quality, “unity” under the 
heading of quantity, and “existence” under the heading of modality? 
Kant gives the reader no indication for thinking that his restriction 
is problematic, but this will prove to be a crucial dividing line for the 
early post- Kantians, as I shall show.
Hints of an argument for Kant’s restriction appear when he writes 
that “apperception is carried through by all classes of categories [in 
seeking to apprehend itself ], but only toward those concepts of the 
understanding which underlie the ground of unity of the remaining 
ones.”27 Yet this argument suffers from at least one shortcoming. For 
when one stops to inspect the table of categories more carefully, it is 
evident that the concepts belonging to the third level play a special 
role, that of unifying the other two. Kant brings this role to the fore-
ground in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783) when he 
says that the third concept “springs from the first and second com-
bined [verbunden] in one concept,”28 a point one finds later in the 1787 
edition of the first Critique:  “the third category always springs from 
 27 Kant, A403.
 28 Kant, Prol 4:326n.
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the combination [Verbindung] of the first two in its class.”29 Granted, 
these comments are not illuminating in so abstract a formulation, but 
the key point for my purposes is this. When one shifts attention from 
the first- level concepts (which constitute the “ground of unity” for the 
others) to the third- level concepts (which “combine” the first two in 
their class), a new possibility opens up. One now has the option of 
approaching the concept of the I, not only through the categories of 
substance, reality, unity, and existence, but also through the catego-
ries of community, limitation, totality, and necessity. A version of this 
insight will be central to the transformation of the apperception prin-
ciple in the hands of Fichte, to whom I now turn.30
3 Persons in Fichte’s Theoretical Philosophy
3.1 “I Am”: Fichte’s Doctrine of Science
I speak of a version of this insight because post- Kantians like Fichte 
do not simply reverse Kant’s progression of categories in approach-
ing the concept of a person. Yet what is clear is that by the time of 
 29 Kant, B110. That is, “community” is the causality of a substance in reciprocal interaction with 
others; “limitation” is the negation of a reality; “totality” is plurality considered as a unity; and 
“necessity” is existence given by possibility itself (B110). We find a similar claim in the Groundwork 
when Kant writes: ‘The above three ways of representing the principle of morality [1. the Formula 
of Universal Law, 2. the Formula of Humanity, and 3. the Formula of Autonomy] are fundamen-
tally only so many formulae of the same law, one of which [i.e., the Formula of Autonomy] unites 
the other two within itself [deren die eine die anderen zwei von selbst in sich vereinigt] (G 4:436; 
emphasis added).
 30 As is well known, Kant rewrote the Paralogisms chapter for the 1787 edition of the first Critique. 
But it remains difficult to say just how much the new version alters the substance of the original, 
or merely its mode of presentation. One thing worth observing is that the new version still insists 
on the analytic or conceptual validity of the four theorems of rational psychology, though Kant’s 
language is more careful. He says, for example, that “the I that I think can always be considered 
as a subject . . . but this does not signify that I as object am for myself a self- subsisting being or 
substance” (B407). In other words, he restricts the scope of “substance” in the new version to 
the particular sense employed (synthetically) by the rational psychologist, whereas in the original 
version “substance” is employed (analytically) as the concept of a subject distinct from predicates 
(A359). I mention this because, even if the early post- Kantians only read the 1787 version of the 
first Critique, they still would have been struck by Kant’s restriction of concepts applicable to the 
“I.” Thanks to Allen Wood for pressing me on this issue.
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Fichte’s works, any trace of the idea that a finite noumenal substance 
lies behind “the thing that thinks” has vanished. And in its place one 
finds a complex attempt to rework Kant’s table of categories around 
the transcendental unity of self- consciousness, starting with an 
account of how “the I exists and comes into being for itself.”31 Here 
Fichte wants to convince his readers that true philosophical inquiry 
must have this starting point, and in saying this he does not mask his 
debt to Kant for separating what is empirical in self- consciousness 
from what is pure. This distinction lies at the center of his “Doctrine of 
Science” (Wissenschaftslehre), which he introduced to the intellectual 
public in 1794 and continued to rework until the end of his life.32 Its 
basic, if cryptic stipulation is that if one wants to secure a “derivation of 
consciousness as a whole”— the equivalent, in Fichte’s view, to a philo-
sophical system— then there is only one place one should begin. One 
should begin with a version of the apperception principle, “with the 
pure I— which is precisely how the Wissenschaftslehre does begin— and 
the idea of such a science has already been provided by Kant himself.”33
When one enters Fichte’s Doctrine of Science for the first time, in 
any of its early versions, it is difficult to see the extent to which his 
concept of a “pure I” adds anything new to the apperception prin-
ciple. In his second introduction to the Foundation of the Entire 
Wissenschaftslehre, for example, Fichte appeals to Kant’s claim that 
the unity of my representations rests on the unity of the “I think” 
attending my representations, asking:  “Which ‘I’ is being spoken of 
here?”34 In his view the answer becomes clear when Kant writes that 
 31 Fichte, ZWEL 1:458. Citations of Fichte refer to Fichtes Werke, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte, 11 
vols. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1971). Translations are my own.
 32 I shall be focusing mainly on the 1794 Wissenschaftslehre. For two compelling treatments of the 
unity of Fichte’s early of Science, see Daniel Breazeale, “The Spirit of the Wissenschaftslehre,” in 
Thinking through the Wissenschaftslehre: Themes from Fichte’s Early Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 96– 123; and Allen W. Wood, Fichte’s Ethical Thought (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016).
 33 Fichte, ZWEL 4:477.
 34 Fichte, ZWEL 4:475.
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pure apperception “must be able to accompany all other representa-
tions” and is therefore “one and the same” in all consciousness.35 What 
this entails is that pure apperception is not determined by anything 
contingent, anything that would pertain to the empirical conscious-
ness of my individuality. Accordingly, Fichte argues, what is pure in 
self- consciousness must be “determined solely by itself.”36 And what 
is determined solely by itself is the absolute activity of the I, which 
is the first principle of his Doctrine of Science. On this basis Fichte 
concludes that one finds “quite definitely” in Kant “the concept of the 
pure I, exactly as it is set up in the Wissenschaftslehre.”37 Yet the textual 
evidence is not so straightforward. For when one enters more deeply 
into Fichte’s writings at the time, a number of contrasts between his 
position and Kant’s come into view.
The first and most obvious of these contrasts is that Fichte turns to a 
version of the apperception principle from a conviction that “philoso-
phy until now has been devoid of a highest, universally valid first princi-
ple, and only after establishing one will philosophy be able to raise itself 
to the level of a science.”38 This is the promise the Wissenschaftslehre 
holds out. If one wants a philosophical system, one must begin with a 
universally valid first principle, that is, a principle that is itself uncon-
ditioned by any higher principle. At this point, when every possible 
option is considered, Fichte thinks one must see that only one can-
didate presents itself with absolute certainty: namely, that I am active 
in positing myself, that “I am I.” What this formulation shows is that 
Fichte’s first principle is not a mere “fact” (Thatsache) of conscious-
ness, something one could discover through introspection alone, but 
an original “fact/ act” (Thathandlung) of the I.39 Interestingly, Fichte 
 35 Kant, B132.
 36 Fichte, ZWEL 4:476.
 37 Fichte, ZWEL 4:476.
 38 Fichte, RA 1:4.
 39 Fichte, GWL 1:96.
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also asserts that the best term philosophers have to characterize one’s 
access to this act is “intellectual intuition,” not because one can employ 
a category to a nonspatial/ nontemporal thing, but because one is 
aware of the self- positing of the I without the mediation of concepts. 
Nowhere in Kant does the apperception principle play this privileged 
role, despite its importance for his theoretical philosophy.
That being said, the real novelty of Fichte’s position comes into 
focus when one considers the implications these departures have, each 
of which bears upon his concept of a person. In the first place, Fichte 
thinks that if we take his founding principle seriously— that I am active 
in positing myself, that “I am I”— then one must see that all further 
talk of something beyond the I is problematic. For one must ask: What 
meaning could philosophers assign to the concept of a “not- I” (as a 
brute given) once they concede that all certainty rests on the I and its 
original activity? Of course, if we disregard this thought and assign 
absolute reality to something beyond the I, then we would effectively 
make the not- I into a higher principle— but that, Fichte points out, 
would contradict our initial insight: that only the I has claim to the 
status of a first principle. How then can we proceed with consist-
ency? The preliminary answer Fichte gives is that the not- I cannot 
be a wholly independent concept, which is to say that the not- I must 
acquire its positive determination in relation to the I itself.40 Now if we 
accept this further point, that the I and the not- I must stand in rela-
tion to each other, Fichte thinks it is obvious that the idea of a “thing 
in itself [Ding an sich], to the extent that this is supposed to be a not- I 
not opposed to any I, is self- contradictory.”41
The steps leading up to Fichte’s rejection of the thing in itself are 
more subtle than I have described, but their general outline should be 
clear. By responding to the demand that philosophy have one univer-
sally valid and self- evident principle, and by identifying this principle 
 40 Fichte, RA 1:20.
 41 Fichte, RA 1:20.
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with the absolute Thathandlung of the I, Fichte comes to the conclu-
sion that all talk of something bearing no connection to the I is unin-
telligible. From the standpoint of his Doctrine of Science, as a result, 
all talk of things endowed with intrinsic properties— the individual 
substance of rational psychology, for instance— ceases to make sense. 
After all, the concept of an intrinsic property is the concept of some-
thing one can think of independently of its relation to anything else, 
that is, something one can think of in total isolation. In the tradition 
of Descartes and Leibniz, as I have shown, a “person” is supposed to 
be thinkable in precisely this way, as a monadic entity whose basic fea-
tures are intelligible without a nexus of relations, including a nexus of 
relations to other monadic entities. From the standpoint of Fichte’s 
Doctrine of Science, one is then in a position to say that the mistake of 
rational psychology occurs at a deeper level than Kant ever diagnosed 
in the Paralogisms. It is not the mistake of seeking to extend cognition 
to a person in itself, but the mistake of assuming that a person is even 
thinkable in total isolation. In Kant’s own terms, the mistake is not 
synthetic, but analytic.
3.2 “I” and “Not- I”: The Priority of Relation
One far- reaching implication of Fichte’s rejection of the thing in itself 
is that all thinking must be governed by the category of relation, includ-
ing philosophical reflection on the I and its absolute activity.42 Indeed, the 
priority of the category of relation underpins his entire Doctrine of 
Science and is without a doubt a leitmotif for the first post- Kantians, 
 42 Writing just after the publication of Fichte’s 1794 Wissenschaftslehre, Schelling says:  “If one 
observes the Kantian Table of these forms more closely, then one actually finds that Kant, instead 
of placing the original form [Urform] as the principle for all the others, posited it among the oth-
ers in the same series. For on closer examination one readily sees that the forms of relation are 
not only the ground [Grunde] for all the others, but are actually identical with the original form 
(the analytic, the synthetic, and the two combined)” (FP 1:107). Citations of Schelling refer to 
Schellings Sämmtliche Werke, ed. Karl Friedrich August Schelling, 12 vols. (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856). 
Translations are my own.
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including Schelling, Schiller, Schleiermacher,43 and Hegel. What is 
more, Fichte interprets Kant’s remark cited earlier, that the “third cat-
egory always arises from the combination of the first two in its class,”44 
as evidence that “community” (Gemeinschaft) or “reciprocal interac-
tion” (Wechselwirkung) is not on a par with the others but is rather the 
“category of all categories.”45 “Substantiality and causality are coordi-
nated with each other,” he writes, “but both are subordinated to the 
category of reciprocal interaction.”46 In Fichte’s view the import of this 
priority is clear: “We can think of nothing but relations.”47 All of this 
explains why it would be a mistake to think of Fichte’s first principle of 
the I as a self- contained principle. Guided by the category of relation, 
Fichte maintains that one cannot think of the I on its own without 
simultaneously positing a not- I— and this introduces his second prin-
ciple, the principle of opposition. Going further still, he argues that 
both the I  and the not- I must determine each other mutually— and 
this introduces his third principle, the principle of interdetermina-
tion. Thus Fichte’s whole argument is of a relational character, since 
the intelligibility of the I is connected inseparably to the not- I and vice 
versa.48
When one examines how Fichte sets up this triad of principles, par-
ticularly in the 1794 Wissenschaftslehre, it becomes clear that his con-
cept of a pure I  is not a direct transposition of Kant’s apperception 
principle. In fact, not long after introducing the concept of the I in this 
 43 See Jacqueline Mariña, Transformation of the Self in the Thought of Schleiermacher (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008) for an outstanding treatment of this topic.
 44 Kant, B110.
 45 Fichte, WLnm 212. These passages come from the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, ed. Erich 
Fuchs (Hamburg: Meiner, 1994), originally student transcripts of Fichte’s private lectures during 
the late 1790s.
 46 Fichte, WLnm 212.
 47 Fichte, WLnm 212.
 48 Fichte, GWL 1:104– 108. In what follows I  am indebted to Paul Franks’s discussion in All 
or Nothing:  Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism 
(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2005). See in particular Franks, All or Nothing, 85 
note 2, 251, and 253.
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work, Fichte tells his readers that in saying “the I determines itself ” he 
means to ascribe to it an “absolute totality of the real” (absolute Totalität 
der Realität).49 Similar remarks appear with greater frequency in the 
text, and at one point Fichte even defines the category of substance in 
openly Spinozistic terms: “Insofar as the I  is regarded as encompass-
ing the whole, absolutely determined realm of all realities,” he writes, 
“it is substance”;50 and a few sentences later: “It is initially only One 
substance, the I; within this One substance, all possible accidents, and 
so all possible realities, are posited.”51 In this way Fichte’s pure I bears 
a conspicuous affinity to the “whole of reality” (omnitudo realitatis) 
which is characteristic of Spinoza’s infinite substance, of which all indi-
vidual parts are mere “limitations.”52 This is a far cry from the model 
of persons Kant carries over from the scholastic tradition, according 
to which the I of the thing who thinks refers (at least negatively) to a 
monadic entity. Nor does Fichte hide the fact that by reframing the I in 
terms of a totality of the real, as an omnitudo realitatis, he is following 
in the footsteps of Spinoza. At one point he even claims, rather boldly, 
that his Doctrine of Science is “Spinozism made systematic.”53
 49 Fichte, GWL 1:129.
 50 Fichte, GWL 1:142.
 51 Fichte, GWL 1:142. Schelling echoes this definition in 1795 when he writes: “If substance is the 
unconditional, then the I  is the only substance,” playing on Spinoza, Ethics 1p14:  “Except God, 
no substance can be or be conceived”; Ethics, in Collected Works of Spinoza, ed. Edwin Curley 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). In this vein Schelling continues: “Were there sev-
eral substances, there would be an I outside the I, which is nonsensical” (IP 1:192). Of course, the 
extent to which this captures Spinoza’s own position is highly contentious, but this question raises 
interpretive issues that go beyond the scope of my chapter.
 52 Fichte, GWL 1:137.
 53 Fichte, GWL 1:122. In a recent essay Jakub Kloc- Konkołowicz has identified— accurately, in my 
view— a “kritischen Monismus der Vernunft” in Fichte’s theoretical philosophy: “It should be— 
like in Spinoza’s— a monism, but a monism grounded, not on a given unity, but rather on an 
aspired unity [einer angestrebten Einheit]”; “Der Kantische Spinozismus: Die Gegenwart Spinozas 
in der Sittenlehre Fichtes,” Fichte- Studien 27 [2006]: 38. A version of this insight was anticipated 
in the nineteenth century by Charles Carroll Everett, who wrote:  “We can now understand 
how the position of Fichte differs at this point from that of Spinoza. With Spinoza, all beings 
are one with God; with Fichte, they tend to become so”; Fichte’s Science of Knowledge: A Critical 
Exposition (Chicago: Griggs, 1884), 256.
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More often than not Fichte is at pains to show where Spinoza 
is wrong, but these points of criticism often hint at a similarity in 
their views. Quite early in the Wissenschaftslehre, for example, Fichte 
writes:
On his [Spinoza’s] view the entire series of representations in an 
empirical subject is related to the one pure subject as a single repre-
sentation is to a series. For him the “I” (what he calls his I, or what 
I call mine) does not exist absolutely because it exists, but because 
something else exists.— The I  for him is indeed an I  for itself, but 
he asks what it would be for something other than the I. Such an 
“other than I” would equally be an I, of which the posited I (e.g. my 
I) and every other that could be posited [i.e., other I’s] would be 
modifications.54
In this passage Fichte explains that Spinoza “does not deny the unity of 
empirical consciousness, but he completely denies [the unity of ] pure 
consciousness,”55 and that, in his view, is Spinoza’s fatal mistake and the 
reason why his system is a form of dogmatism. To be sure, when one 
reads statements like this one might think that Fichte is siding with 
Kant’s claim that “when I think, I am conscious that my I, and not some 
other thing, thinks in me”56— that is, that through pure apperception 
I am aware of existing for myself, as the subject of my thoughts, and 
not as a predicate inhering in something else. Yet on closer inspection 
one can see that what Fichte finds problematic with Spinoza’s position 
is not that it entails the rejection of a plurality of finite substances (and 
our status as noumenal persons) but that it characterizes the one infi-
nite substance as something opposed to the I rather than as the pure 
I itself. So when he writes that a not- I “would equally be an I, of which 
 54 Fichte, GWL 1:102.
 55 Fichte, GWL 1:100.
 56 Kant, PR 28:1041.
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the posited I  (e.g. my I) and every other that could be posited [i.e., 
other I’s] would be modifications,” Fichte is, I believe, giving the reader 
a key for understanding his positive view in the Doctrine of Science. 
On this reading Fichte has no qualms with the omnitudo realitatis of 
Spinoza’s monism; he merely wants to relate this omnitudo realitatis to 
the I, as he thinks a philosophical system demands of us.
This marks a pivotal moment in Fichte’s analysis, since he recog-
nizes that the demands of systematicity lie at the heart of Spinoza’s 
philosophy too. “It is easy to reveal,” he writes, “what drove him to 
his system: namely, the necessary striving to bring about the highest 
unity in human cognition.”57 Spinoza’s only mistake, Fichte argues, 
was that “he thought to deduce on grounds of theoretical reason what 
he was driven to merely by a practical need.”58 From this perspective 
what Spinoza claimed to have established on theoretical grounds was 
a given unity, yet what he should have done, according to Fichte, was 
posit this unity as a “fixed but never reachable ideal.”59 Our effort 
to understand the unity of the pure I, Fichte tells his readers, lead 
us beyond the sphere of theoretical reason into the practical sphere, 
whereby the one absolute I is not something that exists but something 
“that we ought to, and yet cannot, achieve.”60 In other words Fichte 
thinks that if we identify the apperception principle with the totality 
of the real, then what we have before us is not a metaphysical sub-
stratum but a normative goal. Within the aforementioned triad of 
principles, this means that theoretical reason cannot in the end com-
prehend the unity of the I and the not- I in their interdetermination. 
The “knot” between the two, Fichte says, “is not so much loosed as 
projected into infinity.”61
 57 Fichte, GWL 1:101.
 58 Fichte, GWL 1:102.
 59 Fichte, GWL 1:101.
 60 Fichte, GWL 1:101.
 61 Fichte, GWL 1:156.
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4 Moral Perspectives
4.1 Persons in Kant’s Moral Philosophy
Before considering where this fateful “projection” of the I leads Fichte, 
it will be helpful to go back to the Paralogisms one last time and con-
sider Kant’s own effort to motivate a shift to the practical sphere. One 
point of interpretation I think we can now agree on is that, however 
much Kant wants to deflate the ambitions of rational psychology, he 
nevertheless intends to preserve the analytic validity of its theorems. 
At various points in the first Critique he hints at why this is so impor-
tant. In addition to permitting a logical use, the theorems of rational 
psychology are also “sufficient and necessary” for a “practical use.”62 
Because my true nature is unknown to me, he explains, I  will never 
be able to extend cognition to the “independence of its existence.”63 
Yet for all that, “it is likewise possible that I  may find cause, drawn 
from somewhere else than mere speculative grounds, to hope for an 
existence of my thinking nature that is self- sufficient and persisting 
through all possible changes of my state.”64 In saying this Kant is allud-
ing to the grounds people have for thinking of themselves as transcen-
dentally free agents, grounds he believes the moral law brings directly 
to our attention. When I recognize a duty never to lie, for instance, 
I  am at the same time aware of my capacity to act without sensible 
needs or inclinations, and so I am led, Kant argues, to a practical self- 
conception of the will’s spontaneity.65
One might now be inclined to think that Kant is equipped with dis-
tinctly normative reasons for limiting his concept of a person to a finite 
noumenal substance endowed with intrinsic properties. However, it is 
not obvious how this line of interpretation could work. For when one 
considers Kant’s moral argument for attributing intrinsic properties 
 62 Kant, A365.
 63 Kant, A383.
 64 Kant, A383.
 65 Kant, KpV 5:30; RGV 6:26n.
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like “immateriality” to a person, it is clear that his account presupposes 
the analytic validity of such concepts, and so the moral argument has 
no role to play in their initial support. Following Kant one can say that 
people’s awareness of the moral law justifies a conception of the will’s 
spontaneity and with it “belief ” (Glaube) that they have an independ-
ent spiritual life.66 Yet this warrant rests on a prior defense of those 
categories on logical grounds, which is precisely what Kant seeks to do 
in the first Critique. This is not a trivial point. It suggests that Kant’s 
appeal to people’s common moral consciousness only serves to give 
objective (albeit practical) reality to a preexisting conceptual appa-
ratus. Consequently, if there are problems within that apparatus, such 
as an unjustified restriction of the I  to the four theorems of rational 
psychology, then I cannot just retreat to whatever self- conception the 
moral law demands of me. To look ahead, Fichte’s new way of thinking 
about the apperception principle, guided by the category of reciprocal 
interaction, leads him to reject the idea that my moral agency is intel-
ligible as a separate “end in itself ” (Zweck an sich selbst).
I raise these points to emphasize the puzzle of why Kant restricts 
his approach to the apperception principle, as well as to explain why 
the post- Kantians felt no need for such a restriction once they denied 
the thinkability of things in themselves. That Kant holds onto such an 
idea is present in his moral philosophy whenever he speaks of rational 
beings (in the plural) and their elevated rank above the realm of things. 
When one reads in the Groundwork, for example, that rational beings 
are called persons “because of their nature,”67 it is hard to say what Kant 
could mean, if not that the noumenal nature of persons— their intelli-
gence, and above all, their freedom— “marks them out” as belonging to 
a world beyond the senses. Relatedly, when Kant goes on to speak of a 
“kingdom” of rational beings interacting in community, it appears that 
such a community has what one might call a monadic structure, since 
 66 Kant, KpV 5:133.
 67 Kant, G 4:428.
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each person (as a part) is thinkable prior to its inclusion in the com-
munity (as a whole). In this light the individual person enjoys a special 
“dignity,” for Kant, because his capacity for self- legislation “makes him 
fit to be a member of a possible kingdom of ends, of which he was 
by his own nature already destined, as an end in itself.”68 Outside this 
kingdom, however, he still exists like a “world apart.”69
What these considerations bring to light, I believe, is that Kant is 
committed to a form of pluralism, both at the theoretical level in how 
he represents persons as finite noumenal substances, and at the prac-
tical level in how he represents persons as individual moral agents.70 
These two frameworks of explanation are closely connected— more so 
than scholars often admit— to the extent that my self- conception as a 
free being presupposes the category of causality, and to the extent that 
my self- conception as an immortal being presupposes the category of 
immateriality. Thus when Kant argues that the moral law “begins from 
my invisible self, my personality” and in turn “reveals to me a life inde-
pendent of animality and even of the whole sensible world,”71 he is, 
I am suggesting, relying heavily on those aspects of rational psychology 
deemed salvageable in the Paralogisms. By contrast, as much as Fichte 
insists that his position in the Wissenschaftslehre is a Kantian one, 
I have shown that his approach to the concept of the I reveals a com-
mitment to monism, although a monism he claims is both regulative 
and practical in character. In light of this contrast, then, the follow-
ing question becomes urgent: What survives of “persons,” if anything, 
once Fichte ushers in a thoroughly relational framework for philoso-
phy, a framework that brings him closer to the company of Spinoza 
than to Descartes, Leibniz, or even Kant himself ?
 68 Kant, G 4:435; see also KU 5:435.
 69 This is Leibniz’s turn of phrase: “each substance is like a world apart [Monde à part], independent 
of all other things, except God”; Discourse on Metaphysics, ed. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), A 6.4, 1550 = AG 47).
 70 See Ameriks, “Idealism and Kantian Persons.”
 71 Kant, KpV 5:162.
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4.2 Persons in Fichte’s Moral Philosophy
One might now worry that the pendulum has swung too far in the 
other direction, from Kant’s attachment to a monadic I (and thereby 
to a pluralistic view of persons) to Fichte’s attachment to a monis-
tic I (and thereby to a rejection of such pluralism). However, at this 
stage of the discussion one should be mindful of a distinction Fichte 
himself draws between the I  of pure self- consciousness and the I  of 
empirical self- consciousness. What the Doctrine of Science rules out, 
for systematic reasons traced earlier, is the intelligibility of a thing in 
itself and with it the concept of an entity bearing intrinsic properties. 
In this admittedly technical sense Fichte’s theoretical philosophy ren-
ders the idea of a person nonsensical, insofar as a person denotes an 
entity whose nature is thinkable in nonrelational terms (as if it were 
a “world apart”). To the extent that Fichte’s pure I involves no empiri-
cal elements at all, it contains nothing that is unique to one particular 
thinker. And that is why he believes that it is suited to play the role of 
a first principle: as a form of self- positing activity, the pure I is uncon-
ditioned. But again, within the premises of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, 
it would be a mistake for me to assume that my access to this activity 
in the space of philosophical reflection indicates that my individual 
I is similarly unconditioned. So it would be a mistake to represent my 
individual I as an absolute subject, as one might think Kant is guilty 
of doing.
Considering this separation between the pure I  and the individ-
ual I helps to show why the relational framework of the Doctrine of 
Science operates differently in the “Doctrine of Ethics” (Sittenlehre), 
which Fichte published in 1798 under the subtitle According to the 
Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre. As I touched on earlier, these prin-
ciples proceed from the identity of the self- positing I, to the opposi-
tion of the I and the not- I, and finally, to the interdetermination of the 
I and the not- I (i.e., to their reciprocal interaction). In the end Fichte 
concludes that one is unable to comprehend on speculative grounds 
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the mutually determining relation between the I and the not- I, even 
though, he insists, one cannot renounce the first principle and let 
everything depend on the not- I. The only viable solution Fichte sees— 
and this is now the crucial point— is to regard the thought of the not- I 
depending on the I as an unattainable end. The path to the Doctrine 
of Ethics opens up as a result. For what we have before us is the end of 
freedom, independence, and self- sufficiency, contained in the original 
act of the first principle (that of absolute self- positing), except now this 
act has been “projected into infinity” as a practical ideal.72 In his moral 
philosophy Fichte’s guiding question then becomes: How should I act 
in the sensible world, as a finite I, in such a way that I can draw closer 
to or “approach” (annähern) this ideal in my deeds?
My reason for calling attention to this shift in the Doctrine of Ethics 
is that it helps explain why Fichte applies the category of relation spe-
cifically to the individual, limited, or finite I.  This shift is otherwise 
confusing, and as a reader one is liable to be perplexed by Fichte’s 
announcement that consciousness of my individuality is “necessarily 
accompanied by another consciousness, that of a You, and is possible 
only on this condition,”73 or that the “root of my individuality is not 
determined through my freedom, but through my connection with 
other rational beings.”74 The veil of mystery surrounding such state-
ments begins to lift when one realizes that Fichte regards the individ-
ual I as a mere mode formed by, and so initially dependent on, a nexus 
of relations with others. To secure this idea in his moral philosophy 
Fichte once more relies on the three concepts under the heading of 
relation, but this time his concern is with how these concepts bear 
upon one’s particular selfhood. His central claim, which I  can only 
 72 Fichte, GWL 1:156. For an excellent account of the path from Fichte’s 1794 Wissenschaftslehre to 
his 1796 “Doctrine of Right,” see Douglas Moggach, “Reciprocity, Elicitation, Recognition: The 
Thematics of Intersubjectivity in the Early Fichte,” Dialogue: Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 
(1999): 271– 295.
 73 Fichte, ZWEL 1:476.
 74 Fichte, SL 4: 222– 223.
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sketch here, is that if one can discover the conditions necessary for 
being a particular finite self, then one can articulate a system of duties 
whose performance would put one closer to attaining the end of self- 
sufficiency.75 In the Sittenlehre Fichte develops these conditions with 
explicit reference to the category of relation, from the embodiment 
of the individual I (under the category of causality) to its intelligence 
(under the category of substance) and finally to its sociality (under the 
category of reciprocal interaction).76
The claim that sociality is a necessary condition for selfhood is 
itself extraordinary, since it confers transcendental status on others. 
Nothing like this idea is to be found in Kant, who remains committed 
to the rationalist school in thinking of relations with others as a merely 
contingent feature of selfhood. Fichte for his part is aware of this, 
and on one occasion he even refers to Kant’s failure to warrant one’s 
belief in the existence of others as the “most striking demonstration of 
the incompleteness” of his system.77 Some of Fichte’s most evocative 
insights turn on the question of how relations with others constitute 
the basis of one’s agency— through what he describes as a “summons” 
(Aufforderung), issued by another, for one to engage in free activity. It 
should then come as no surprise that Fichte rejects the thought that 
people have all the cognitive equipment they need to become aware 
of themselves as particular individuals. Without a summons, and so 
without one’s awareness of another rational being (a “You”), one could 
not become self- conscious at all.78 In the Sittenlehre Fichte draws on 
this claim to give a substantive account of self- sufficiency, specifying 
its domain of application in the sensible world to the “entire commu-
nity” outside oneself.79 With a glance back to the Wissenschaftslehre, 
 75 Fichte, SL 4:216.
 76 Fichte, SL 4:216– 221. For a helpful overview of these three conditions, see Hansjurgen Verweyen, 
Recht und Sittlichkeit in J. G. Fichtes Gesellschaftslehre (Freiburg: Alber, 1975), 144– 146.
 77 Fichte, WLnm 141– 142.
 78 Fichte, GNR 3:33– 37; SL 4:219– 220.
 79 Fichte, SL 4:255.
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we might say that the concept of the unlimited I as the omnitudo or 
“whole” of all realities at last becomes concretized in the Doctrine of 
Ethics, namely, as the omnitudo or “whole” of all rational beings.
While this gives the reader nothing more than a sketch, it should be 
clearer how deeply Fichte’s monism impacts his understanding of the 
moral law and the practical self- conception it demands of people. In 
Kant’s eyes, the moral law requires that each individual see herself as 
a separate end in herself and as an independent source of moral value, 
even though she is at the same time bound to act as if her maxims were 
to hold for other persons in a possible kingdom of ends. In Fichte’s 
eyes, the moral law requires that each individual see herself as nothing 
more than an active tool or “instrument” (Werkzeug) for the commu-
nity at large, and she is bound to perfect herself only insofar as doing 
so would make her more fit to promote the self- sufficiency of reason 
as such (SL 4:215).80 One’s individuality, for Fichte, enjoys no special 
rank or dignity, and the moral law even demands that people recognize 
this about themselves. “This ought to be the goal of all our thinking 
and acting,” he writes, “and even of our individual cultivation: our final 
end is not ourselves but everyone.”81 In this way the concept of an end 
in itself remains valid within Fichte’s moral philosophy, but only if it 
refers to the totality of the social, not to the individual I. Thus, if there 
is room left open in the Sittenlehre for the concept of a person as free, 
self- sufficient, and independent, then it must refer, not to any finite 
thing, but to an infinite end.82
The story I have only begun to unravel in this chapter is very much 
a story of the rise of the concept of persons (in Kant) and its abrupt 
 80 Fichte, SL 4:215.
 81 Fichte, SL 4:253; emphasis added. This is why Fichte’s normative ethics amounts to a form of 
social perfectionism, as I  have argued elsewhere:  “Fichte’s Normative Ethics:  Deontological or 
Teleological?,” Mind 127 (2018): 565– 584.
 82 Here I am indebted to Allen Wood’s essay “Fichte on Freedom: The Spinozistic Background,” in 
Spinoza and German Idealism, ed. Eckart Förster and Yitzhak Y. Melamed (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 121– 135.
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decline (in Fichte). In the first case, Kant’s critique of rational psychol-
ogy in the Paralogisms amounts to a curtailment of the metaphysical 
space for understanding persons. Kant thinks that if one acknowledges 
the limits of the human mind, one must accept that persons can never 
be items of strong knowledge claims, beyond how they appear under the 
conditions of space and time. Within the Critical system, this does not 
amount to a rejection of all conceptual space for persons, which Kant 
thinks permits both a logical use and, even more significantly, a practi-
cal use. On the grounds of people’s common moral consciousness they 
must regard themselves as transcendentally free, and this entitles them 
to believe (without ever truly knowing) that they are finite noumenal 
substances endowed with the sort of intrinsic properties thinkers like 
Descartes and Leibniz ascribed to the soul. All the early post- Kantians 
would agree that Kant’s commitment to this ontological model rests 
on a problematic attachment to the thing in itself. And by the time one 
arrives at Fichte’s writings, the concept of persons as monadic entities 
becomes unthinkable, along with the idea that people are separate ends 
in themselves. It is only in Fichte’s moral philosophy, I have suggested, 
that something like a Kantian person survives— not as the freedom, 
independence, and self- sufficiency of one rational being, but as the 
freedom, independence, and self- sufficiency of all rational beings.
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